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PRIVILEGES AND POWERS OF A CORPORATION
AND THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
ALBERT J. HARNO
Threshing over old straw is not a particularly exhilarating
pastime. The writer is aware that the subject matter here pro-
posed is old straw, which has been worn into fine chaff through
constant handling. He offers his appreciation to the gentle and
courteous reader who may pursue this study, and presents as an
apology for its appearance that after having taught the subject
of Private Corporations for several years, and having given a
moderate amount of study to it, he has evolved some theories
which may be helpful. To obviate the possibility' of disappoint-
ment, the writer wishes to inform the reader at the outset that
there is to be found in these pages no solution of the problems
relating to ultra vires acts of corporations. There follow merely
some suggestions which have been found useful and convenient
in the class room.
It is believed that it would be helpful to our thinking in this
subject if a differentiation were made between the concepts
power and privilege: it is submitted, if this were done, that a
great many of the incidents of corporations which we now call
powers would be found to be privileges, and that this discrimina-
tion would clarify and render more intelligible many of our prob-
lems. The concepts privilege and power are used in this study
as defined by Hohifeld.1 There is no desire nor necessity, how-
ever, because of that fact, of being drawn into a Hohfeldian con-
troversy. Hohfeld's qualified usage of the terms has simply been
found useful in making discriminations, and, after all, he has
merely given these words a meaning already in common use.
The concept privilege will henceforth in these pages be used ns
denoting permission. When it is said that a person is privileged
in a certain line of conduct, the meaning will be that he may pro-
ceed without fear of being penalized. The concept powcr will
be used to denote a situation where one person has a legal control,
through the volitional exercise of which he can change the legal
relations existing between him and another or between that other
and a third person.2
Our thinking in this field would be simplified further, if a real-
istic view were taken of the nature and incidents of a corporation.
Under such a view this invisible, intangible creature, which is
1Fdndamental Legal Conceptions (1923) 23 et scq.
2 Hohfeld, loc. cit. svpra. See also Corbin, Lcgal Ancaysi and Tcnin-
ology (1919) 29 YAM. LAW JOURNAL, 163. The writer is aware that
other legal concepts must necessarily enter into the situation. In this
study, however, he wishes merely to emphasize the two mentioned.
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said to have its lair only in contemplation of law, would be found
to be quite mild and harmless. After all, a private corporation is
but a group of individuals who have found it convenient to con-
duct a business through certain legal means and channels which
have been made possible through the permission of that organiza-
tion we call the state.
3
Through this association various new legal contacts are made.
The legal situation has become more complicated, as new privi-
leges and powers have been conferred on the group through the
nod of assent of that potent organization, the state. But the
general scheme remains the same. Strangely enough, in speak-
ing of the powers of a corporation, we ascribe their origin to
the state, without thinking that all the powers, privileges, etc.,
possessed by a natural person are secured in a like manner.
4
What legal rights, powers, privileges, etc., does the individual
have that do not have their inception in that organization we call
the state? X, an individual, has the privilege of making a con-
tract, of defending himself, of smoking a cigar, without fear of
being penalized for so doing by organized society. Now, who can
say how long it will be before the smoking privilege will be with-
drawn from him as has been the brimming glass? So too, X has
the legal power to enter into a contract with Y and thereby to
create a new obligation. This is a means of contact between
individuals which organized society favors. Possibly in the years
to come some great reformers may change the viewpoint of the
state on this feature and the order may then well be: the indi-
vidual has no legal power to enter into contracts. His situation
would in this particular then be like that of a married woman at
common law, or that of a monk. This new radical state may
even go further and completely withdraw the privilege of making
a contract, imposing a penalty for disobedience. The point is,
an individual may do what the state permits him to do; he can
create new legal obligations only as long as the state sanctions
them; he has legal privileges and powers only through the grace
of organized society.
The state organization can restrict or extend his privileges and
3 "When all is said and done, a corporation is just an association of
natural persons conducting business under legal forms, methods, and
procedure that are sui generis." Hohfeld, op. cit. at 198. See also United
States v. Trinidad Coal Co. (1890) 137 U. S. 160, 11 Sup. Ct. 57.
4 "It is true that a corporation is a creature of the law; but so, too, are
all legal rights and duties creatures of the law; and when the law creates
a corporation, an artificial being, why should it not, so far as its nature
permits, be capable of enjoying, and being affected by, all the rights and
duties which have been previously created by the law? Why assume the
necessity of another special creation of rights and duties for the corpora-
tion, supplementary to the creation of the corporation, and of rights and
o-1ities in general?" G. H. W., Ultra Vires (1878) 6 CANT. L. Joun. 2, 4.
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powers. Also, and this has important bearing on the discussion
to follow in connection with the privileges and powers of corpor-
tions, the individual may have the legal power to do an act with-
out the privilege. Conduct is privileged when the individual may
proceed free from restraint; when he may act without incurring
the disapproval of the state. With this meaning of the concept
privilege before us, certainly it would not be contended that the
individual is privileged in the commission of a crime or a tort.
The frown on the countenance of the state organization is ap-
parent. If in the concept power there lies the answer to what
the individual can do to bring himself into new legal relations, it
must also be clear that the individual can commit a tort or a
crime and thus cause new legal obligations. The individual, in
other words, has the legal power to create crime and tort obliga-
tions, but not the legal privilege.
When a person appoints another as his agent, he does so by the
permission of the state. This is a means of contact between in-
dividuals which the state sanctions, and no penalty ordinarily vill
be incurred for this conduct. The individual, as a member of
the organized community in which he resides, has the legal privi-
lege of having certain acts performed for him by another. By
doing this, however, he has complicated his legal relations. It is
said that the principal has clothed the agent with authority to act
for him. But whence comes the power of the principal to extend
his activities in this manner? Must he not first have the approval
of the group organization? It is found convenient to members of
the group nowadays to promote intercourse by means of the prin-
cipal-agent relation. But be it remembered that such a legal re-
lation is possible only through the sanction of the organization in
which we live.
This organization is to-day giving its approval to partnership
associations as a legitimate mode of carrying on a business. In
the efforts of our people to promote economic advancement, it has
been found convenient for some to combine in what we call part-
nerships and thereby to utilize certain powers and privileges
that do not appertain to an individual acting alone or to an indi-
vidual acting through an agent. The state organization has given
its sanction to this method of conducting business. It will be
observed that there are certain legal burdens that attach to part-
nerships, but there are also legal benefits. By some it has been
thought that the benefits have outweighed the burdens sufficiently
to warrant their association in this manner. The doing of busi-
ness with the privileges that appertain to partnership association
differs only in detail from that of doing business with privileges
incident to corporations.
What, then, is a corporation? A creature of the law-invisi-
ble, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law?
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Hardly all that. It is a group of individuals who have associ-
ated and organized themselves in a manner approved by the state
by means of which they may enjoy certain privileges appertain-
ing to this form of organization. There is in this theory no nec-
essity to personify an immortal spook and to whisper of it that
it often acts almost humanly. Talk of the entity doing things
and of possessing powers and privileges is a mere fiction., The
incidents and characteristics commonly assigned to corporations
are merely privileges by means of which individuals may more
fully enjoy their property.0
This feature, although lost sight of later, was clearly perceived
by Kyd writing in 1793. He said:
"That a body framed by the policy of man, a body whose parts
and members are mortal, should in its own nature be immortal,
or that a body composed, of many bulky, visible bodies, should be
invisible, in the common acceptation of the words, seems beyond
the reach of common understandings. A corporation is as visible
a body as an army; for though the commission or authority be
not seen by every one, yet the body, united by that authority, is
seen by all-but the blind: When, therefore, a corporation is said
to be invisible, that expression must be understood, of the right
[jbrivilege] in many persons, collectively, to act as a corporation,
and then it is as visible in the eye of the law, as any other right
whatever, of which natural persons are capable; . . ." I
We have seen in the case of the individual that he may do
certain things without fear of interference by the state. These
are his privileges. As to other proposed acts the order is: if
you do that, you will be penalized. As to these acts, the indi-
vidual is not privileged; in fact he is under a duty not to do
them. In the case of a partnership a more complex situation
arises, and new privileges not appertaining to individuals acting
alone, are incident to it. In the case of a corporation we have
again an association of individuals with an additional and a more
complicated scheme of privileges. But at the base, the two
associations are quite similar.8 In fact, the association of the
5 "However, it is essential to a clear understanding of many important
branches of the law of corporations to bear in mind distinctly, that the
existence of a corporation independently of its shareholders is a fiction;
and that the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality
the rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imagi-
nary being." 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed. 1886) 3.
6 "Strangely enough, it has not always been perceived with perfect clear-
ness that transacting business under the forms, methods, and procedure
pertaining to so-called corporations is simply another mode by which in-
dividuals or natural persons can enjoy their property and engage in busi-
ness." Hohfeld, op. cit. supra note 1, at 197.
7Kyd, Corporations (1793) 15-16.
8 "A corporation like a partnership is an association of natural persons
who contribute a joint capital for a common purpose, and although the
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shareholders in a corporation and the relation they bear to each
other is a kind of modified partnership association,9 the only
difference being that the privileges vary in detail.
By organizing as a corporation the members escape individual
responsibility to answer for the obligations of the group. This
privilege (which is also a legal immunity) is enjoyed by the
members of the corporation group but not by the partnership
associates. Another privilege of great convenience to the cor-
poration group lies in the fact that property may be held in a
common name, and suits may be brought and defended under
that name. So we might proceed with all the incidents and char-
acteristics commonly ascribed to corporations. The point is
that all of these are privileges which the associates enjoy through
the permission of organized society. There is nothing artificial
about it. One group finds it convenient to enjoy privileges
incident to a partnership, another finds its welfare and prosperity
promoted through organizing in a different way and becoming
what is called a corporation. Both methods are sanctioned by
the state, and both groups enjoy the privileges they have through
the assent and permission of the state. The method of organiza-
tion is different; the privileges of the corporation group are
ordinarily set out more specifically through action of the legisla-
ture, but the ambit within which the partnership associates may
act is defined scarcely less definitely through other means by
which organized society makes its wishes and commands lmown.
Under this view the so-called corporate entity resolves itself into
nothing more nor less than a group of privileges possessed by
individuals to do business in this manner.
The state has also conferred on the members of the corporation
group certain distinct powers, that is, the ability or capacity to
create new legal obligations. This legal control when possessed
by an individual is called a power, but from the viewpoint of the
state which sanctions, it is also a privilege. When the attitude
of the state is that one may pursue a certain line of conduct
without interference from the organization, we have a privilege.
To the corporation group the permission is: you may take a
common name, you may enter into legal obligations using this
name, you may hold property in this name, the property which
shares may be assigned to new individuals in perpetual zuccession, yet
the number of shares and amount of capital cannot be increaced, except
in the manner, expressly authorized by the charter or articles of aoQeia-
tion." Mr. Justice Bradley in Railuay Compang re. Alkra (1873) 85
U. S. 233, 235.
9 "In trading corporations the relation of the members or shareholders
to one another is in fact a modified contract of partnership, w:hich in the
view of courts of equity is governed by the ordinary rules of partnership
law so far as they are not excluded by the constitution of the company."
Pollock, Priuzeples of Contract (9th ed. 1921) 131.
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you thus hold is alone subject for the debts you have incurred by
means of this procedure. All these are privileges.", Whenever
the privilege involves the capacity to create new legal obligations
there is associated with it a power. The making of a contract
involves the exercise of both a privilege and a power.
But, as we have seen, there are legal powers which are not
also privileges. Torts and crimes fall within this group. By
committing an assault and battery the individual has exercised a
legal power and thus has brought himself into new legal relations
with another. But in no sense has society said to him: you may
assault and beat others and expect no penalty for such conduct.
It was failure to distinguish at this point which lead early judges
and writers into error as to the capacity of a -corporation to
commit torts or crimes." The argument was frequently raised
in the earlier cases, since a corporation was a mere creature of
the law, and since it could act only as authorized by its charter,
that it could not do a wrong, because its charter did not authorize
wrongs. The following line of reasoning typically represents the
viewpoint of these cases:
"Corporations are the creatures of the law, of a highly refined
and intangible nature, whose properties and attributes, lawyers
alone can understand. Deriving their existence from the law,
they must be governed by the terms of the law which creates
them. They must proceed and be pursued in the path prescribed
by the law. If the corporators do an act, beyond their powers,
they, as individuals, and not the corporation of which they are
members, must answer it. * * * Now, a corporation never
was and never can be authorized by law to commit a tort; they
can invest no one with power for that purpose. If, therefore,
an agent constituted for a legal purpose, inflict an injury, the
corporation is no more answerable than it would be for an act of
that agent, done without any authority whatever derived from
it, because being unauthorized to commit a wrong, it is out of
the scope of its corporate powers. The act of the law, like the
act of God, can work a wrong to no one, and if a man sustain
damage by it, it is damnum absque injuria." 12
10 Organized society may go further and create legal immunities. But
even a so-called immunity is not invulnerable. If the existing social
organization is overthrown and a new one installed, immunities are often
found to be merely revocable privileges.
11 "There are also certain privileges and disabilities that attend an aggre-
gate corporation. * * * It can neither maintain, or be made defendant
to, an action of battery or such like personal injuries; for a corporation
can neither beat nor be beaten, in its body politic. A corporation cannot
commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in its corporate capacity. . ..
1 Blackstone, Commentaries, *476.
1 From the argument of counsel for the plaintiffs in error in The
Chestnut Hill and Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter (1818, Pa.) 4
Serg. and R. 6, 9.
The modern view on this subject is stated by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Nearing (1918, S. D. N. Y.) 252 Fed. 223, 231 as follows:
"Finally, the defendants urge that a corporation cannot be guilty of
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Such reasoning appeared to follow logically from the special
capacity theory of a corporation. But even on that theory, it
lacked discrimination; and the conclusion that the corporation
was not answerable for torts and crimes, though seemingly
plausible, was a non sequitur. The associates composing a cor-
poration do not have the privilege any more than the individual
unassociated, to commit crimes and torts, but like the individual,
they have the power to do so. Mr. Chief Justice Comstock
probably had this distinction in mind when he gave his opinion
in the case of Bissell v. The Michigan Southc rn aad NYortkcdi
Indiana Railroad Cos.13
Once the discrimination is made between privileges and powers,
a logical basis is found for the modern cases which make corpora-
tions responsible for torts and crimes.
The distinction between privileges and powers also assists in
explaining the doctrine prevalent in America relating to de facto
corporations. The de facto corporation is a result of imperfect
organization; where in the formation of a corporation there has
not been a substantial compliance with the law. It is generally
held that certain circumstances must concur before the courts
will recognize the doctrine. Those commonly mentioned are, a
the crime of conspiracy, or of any crime involving specific intent. This
question simply turns upon how far the law has gone in imputing to a
corporation the acts of its agents. Specifically it turns upon how far
a publishing company, authorized to publish a pamphlet, is responsible
for the acts of its officers, when actuated by the requisite intent. It is
a question upon which the law has always tended towards larger and
larger liability. In torts the liability is now established in the kindred
case of libel (Evening Journal v. McDermott 44 N. J. Law, 430, 43 Am.
Rep. 392), as in malicious prosecution (Corn ford r. Carleton Banh! (1839)
. Q. B. 392). Certainly corporations may be guilty of criminal frauds.
Cohen v. U. S. 157 Fed. 651, 85 C. C. A. 113; Kaufmwn -e. U. S. 212 Fed.
613, 129 C. C. A. 149, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 466. Now, there is no distinction
in essence between the civil and the criminal liability of corporations,
based upon the element of intent or wrongful purpose. Each is merely
an imputation to the corporation of the mental condition of its agents.
It was, it is true, for long supposed that the criminal liability of cor-
porations could not extend beyond the neglect of those positive duties
imposed by law; but that depended upon the theory that acts of mal-
feasance being illegal must be ultra vires. It did not survive a more
generous view of the doctrine of ultra vires. Joplin Mcrcatntile Co. V.
U. S. 213 Fed. 926, 935, 131 C. C. A. 160, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 470, a case
affirmed without consideration of this question in Joplin M3c1cantic Co.
v. U. S. 236 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 291, 59 L. Ed. 705. That the criminal
liability of a corporation is to be determined by the kinship of the act
to the powers of the officials who commit it is true enough; but neither
the doctrine of ultra vires, nor the difficulty of imputing intent or motive,
should be regarded any longer to determine the result."
13 (1860) 22 N. Y. 258, 266-267. This is apparent from the following
quotation taken from that case.
"One of the sources of error in reasoning upon legal as well as other
questions, is, inexactness in the use of language, or, perhaps in the im-
perfectness of language, to express the varieties of thought. It is a self-
evident truth, that a natural person cannot exceed the powers which
belong to his nature. In this proposition, we use words in their literal
and exact sense. In the same sense, it is a truth equally evident that a
corporation cannot exceed its powers; but this is only aszerting that it
cannot exercise attributes which it does not possess. As an imperzonal
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valid law under which a corporation might be incorporated, a
bona fide attempt to comply with the law, and the exercise of
corporate functions.1 4
Where a group of individuals has formed merely a de facto
corporation the law views it as an organization which can enter
into legal obligations as well as can the corporation de lure.5
When it becomes a party to a legal relation, its duties can be
enforced against it, and it in turn can sue to enforce its rights
without fear of collateral attack on its corporate existence. Leg-
ally it differs from a de jure corporation only in this: it is vulner-
able to a direct ouster proceeding at the instance of the state,
while a de jure one is not.16 In terms of privileges and powers,
the corporation de facto does not have the privilege to transact
business as a corporation;17 for the state has not promised it
being, it cannot experience religious emotion, or feel the moral sentiments.
Corporations are said to be clothed with certain powers enumerated in
their charters or incidental to those which are enumerated, and it is also
said they cannot exceed those powers; therefore it has been urged that
all attempts to do so are simply nugatory. The premises are correct
when properly understood; but the conclusion is false, because the premises
are misinterpreted. When we speak of the powers of a corporation, the
term only expresses the privileges and franchises which are bestowed in
the charter; .and when we say it cannot exercise other powers, the just
meaning of the language is, that as the attempt to do so is without au-
thority of law, the performance of unauthorized acts is a usurpation which
may be a wrong to the State, or, perhaps, to the shareholders. But the
usurpation is possible. In the same sense, natural persons are under the
restraints of law, but they may transgress the law, and when they do so
they are responsible for their acts. From this consequence corporations
are not, in my judgment, wholly exempt. The privileges and franchises
granted are not the whole of a corporation. Every trading corporation
aggregate includes an association of persons having a collective will, and
a board of directors or other agency in which that will is embodied, and
through which it may be exerted in modes of action not expressed in the
organic law. Thus, like moral sentient beings, they may and do act in
opposition to the intention of their creator, and they ought to be ac-
countable for such acts."
14 1 Machen, Modern Law of Corporations (1908) 243.
1 See Warren, Executed Ultra Vires Transactions (1910) 23 HIAV. Xj.
Rav. 495.
10 "A de facto corporation is a reality. It has an actual and substan-
tial legal existence. It is, as the term implies, a corporation. * * *
It is bound by all such acts as it might rightfully perform as a corpora-
tion de jure. Where it has attempted in good faith to assume corporate
powers; where its proceedings in that behalf are colorable, and are ap-
proved by those officers of the state who are authorized to act in that
regard; where it has honestly proceeded for a number of years, without
interference from the state, to transact business as a corporation; has
been reputed and dealt with as a duly incorporated body, and valuable
rights and interests have been acquired and transferred by it, no sub-
stantial reason is suggested why its corporate existence, in a suit in-
volving such transactions, should be subject to attack by any other party
than the state, and then only when it is called upon in a direct proceeding
for that purpose, to show by what authority it assumes to be a corpora-
tion. * * * That the judgment of ouster did not and could not have
a retroactive effect upon the rights of the society, and of parties who had
dealt with it during its de facto existence, is suggested by the opinion of
Wright, J., in Gaff v. Flesher, 33 Ohio St. 115". Society Perun v. love-
land (1885) 43 Ohio St. 481, 490, 491, 497, 3 N. E. 357, 360, 364.
17 The discussion here is from the viewpoint of the state. The do facto
corporation group owes no duty to others than the state to refrain from
corporate action.
PRIVILEGES AND POWERS OF A CORPORATION 21
would not interfere should the group undertake to conduct itself
as a corporation. The state, in fact, holds the threat of an ouster
proceeding over it continually, which frequently culminates in an
actual suit and a judgment of ouster. The de facto corporation
has, however, the power to enter into legal relations,"5 for all
legal contracts formed before the ouster proceedings are allowed
to stand and they can be enforced in the courts.'2 The point is
that a de facto corporation has the legal power to conduct itself
as a corporation, but not the legal privilege.
With the formation of a corporation de jvre the organization
is no longer vulnerable in the matter of having its privilege to
act as a corporation questioned; but there remain for the associ-
ates the risks and pitfalls which have been ushered in in connec-
tion with the doctrine of ultra vires. '2 This doctrine is a recent
innovation.-
It would seem, however, that the view still prevails in England
and in her dominions that royal charter corporations are not
subject to collateral attack because of ultra vires transactions.22
"There still, however, subsists a difference of a fundamental
character between a chartered company and a company formed
under a special Act or registered under the Companies Acts, and
it is this: at common law a corporation created by the ing's
charter has power, as was determined in the Sutton'ns Hospltal
case,2 to deal with its property, to bind itself by contracts, and to
do all such acts as an ordina;'y person can do, and so complete is
this corporate autonomy that it is unaffected even by a direction
Is "Consciously, or unconsciously, all courts today do treat some un-
authorized corporate action as corporate action. For example: Persons
have sought to become incorporated, but have failed to perform a condi-
tion precedent to incorporation. They neverthelezs assume to act as a
corporation. All courts, under some circumstances, treat this unauthorized
corporate action as corporate action, and give legal validity to it a3 such."
Warren, op. cit. supra note 15, at 497.
19 See Society Perun v. Cleveland, supra note 16.
20 These vicissitudes also appertain to do facto organizations.
21 "There is no such thing as ultra vires in the case of a common law
corporation * * * and it is not enacted in any statute. It affords, per-
haps, the most remarkable instance in the history of English jurispru-
dence of the making of law by the judges; and having once been createl,
it is now probably saddled onto the backs of the courts, like Sinbad's Old
Man of the Sea, not to be shaken off." G. H. W., op. cit. rnpra note 4,
at 3. See also Buckley, Companies and Limited Partncmohl:p, Act- (9th
ed. 1909) 11; Pollock. op. cit. szlpra note 9, at 129, 130; Green's & Brice'a
Ultra Vires (1880) 28; Warren, op. cit. s?:pra note 15, at 496; Thompson,
Are Joint Stock Companzes Common Law Corporations? (1922) 2 Can.
L. T. 143, 150; Ibid. 245; Mulvey, The Companics Act (1919) 39 Can.
L. T. 79, 94; Blackburn, J., in Riche v. Ashbury Ry. Carria.qc Co. (1S74)
L. R. 9 Ex. Ch. 224, 262-264; Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy (1896) 151
N. Y. 24, 45 N. E. 390.
22 Britiszh South African Co. v. Do Beers (1910) 1 Oh. 354; Boa:zazc
Creek Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. Rex (1916) 1 A. C. 566; Edwards v. Black-
wore (1918) 42 0. L. R. 105; Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra
Vires be Discarded? (1923) 33 YAm LAW JOURNAL, 49. Mr. Machen in the
second volume of his excellent work on Corporations, pp. 823-828, questions
whether this view is fully sustained.
23 (1612) 10 Co. *1.
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contained in the creating charter in limitation of the corporate
powers: For the common law has always held that such a direc-
tion of the Crown-though it may give the Crown a right to annul
the charter if the direction is disregarded-can not derogate
from that plenary capacity with which the common law endows
the company, even though the limitation is an essential part of
the so-called bargain between the Crown and the corporation.
* * * This feature-the unrestricted corporate capacity of
the chartered company-is in marked contrast to the strict de-
limitation by the legislature and the Courts of the statutory or
registered company to its defined objects." 24
In the case of the charter corporations the situation would
seem to be (as it was with the common law corporation) that
these organizations have the legal power to enter into ultra vires
transactions but not the legal privilege. The charter organiza-
tion does not have the crown's permission to commit ultra vires
acts. The crown has not said to it, you may do these acts with-
out interference or- penalty, but rather it has made it clear that
if conduct ultra vires is indulged in both interference and penalty
may be expected. But since the ultra vires transactions of such
organizations are valid until the crown acts, it follows that the
charter corporation has the power to engage in ultra vires un-
dertakings. Of course, when the crown does act, the penalty
to the corporation may include a cancellation of these powers.2
The situation with reference to the English statutory corpora-
tion is different. In the noted case of Ashbury Railway Carriage
and Iron Co. v. Riche,2" the House of Lords held that under the
Companies Acts corporations were possessed of only limited
capacity and'that ultra vires contracts did not bind the corpora-
tion. The English courts carry out this theory with severe con-
sistency, and even a judgment by consent upon an ultra vires
contract has been held not to be binding on the corporation. - ,
Under this view, which appears to treat ultra vires acts as mere
nullities, it will be observed that the corporation has neither the
power nor the privilege to engage in such transactions.-8 It does
24 Palmer, Company Law (10th ed. 1916) 3.
25 If the discrimination made in this study between powers and privileges
is correct, the phrase ultra vires as used in connection with corporations,
is inaccurate, meaning as it does, outside or beyond the powers of the
corporation. Where this expression is used in defining a corporate act,
we often find the situation to be that the act is beyond both the powerl
and privileges of the corporation; frequently it is beyond the privileges
but within the powers; but never is it beyond the powers but within the
privileges.
26 (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653.
27 2 Machen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 829.
28 It would seem under the English authorities that an ultra vires con-
tract even though fully executed is nevertheless treated as void, and that
there is no quasi-contractual responsibility. This would seem to strengthen
the view that, under the English holdings, there is neither the privilege
nor the power to enter into ultra vires transactions.
PRIVILEGES AND POWERS OF A CORPORATION 23
not have the privilege because the ultra vires acts are outside
of the express or implied privileges conferred, and it has not
the power because any effort to create a legal relation of this
nature is futile.
As the field of American cases dealing with ultra vires trans-
actions is approached, the investigator is dismayed by the great
confusion and want of consistency among the cases. Certain
general groupings of decisions may, however, be made. The
authorities quite uniformly agree, when an ultra vires contract
is wholly executory on both sides, that it is not enforceable.-
At the further extreme, when the contract has been fully exe-
cuted on both sides, the view is that it should not be opened
up or upset by the courts.2 ' In cases where the contract has
been partially performed, there is a difference of opinion. W"hat
appears to be a majority of jurisdictions hold to the view that
an action can be brought on the contract.2 1 In other jurisdictions
the view is maintained that no action will lie on the contract,
and recovery, if any, must be had on the principles of quasi-
contract 2 -
Although these general classifications can be made, there re-
mains much confusion. No American cases quite approach the
position of the English decisions relative to charter corporations,
where we found that the power but not the privilege existed for
ultra vires undertakings. Nor do any of the American cases
quite go to the other extreme set by the English cases with
respect to statutory corporations, where we found that neither
the privilege nor the power for ultra vires conduct was recog-
nised. There is no definite view of the American courts, but one
finds a great many views and combinations of views, which ap-
pear to hover in between the two extreme positions set by the
English courts. All American courts would seem to agree that
the privilege for ultra vires action does not exist. In certain
federal cases a view is taken which approaches the English one
relating to statutory corporations, but difficult problems are en-
countered in attempting to analyze the cases.
The expression is frequently found in the cases that all ultra
vires contracts are iMegal and void. In the language of Mr. Jus-
tice Gray: 33
"The charter of a corporation, read in the light of any general
29 2 Mlachen, op. cit. at 857-859.
But see Harris v. Independence Gas Co. (1907) 70; Kan. 750, 02 Pac.
1123. And see an article, Pepper, The Unauthorizcd or Prohibited Excr-
cise of Corporate Power (1895) 9 Har'. L. Rev. 255.
302 Mlachen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 833, 843.
3"Ibid. at 851-855.
32Ibid. at 840-841, 855-857.
3 Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (1891) 139
U. S. 24, 48, 11 Sup. Ct. 478, 484.
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laws which are applicable, is the measure of its powers, and the
enumeration of those powers implies the exclusion of all others
not fairly incidental. All contracts made by a corporation be.
vond the scope of those powers are unlawful and void, and no
action can be maintained upon them in the courts. * * * "
It would, seem that this language would line up the federal
view alongside the English one as to statutory corporations, and
that consequently there would be neither the privilege nor the
power to indulge in ultra vires acts. But the words illegal and
void are elusive; it is feared that they are frequently used like
curse words to fill in where other language fails.
It is hoped that some one may some time give these words a
thorough diagnosis. To such person, with reference particularly
to the problem under discussion, the suggestion is made that an
act is void when it does not give rise to new legal relations;
when the person who does it has no legal power to create a legal
obligation in that manner. If the act is simply void (but not
illegal), there still is a privilege to do it, since no penalty is
prescribed for it, and since there is no duty not to do it." The
situation may be quite different in the case of an illegal act. No
legal privilege exists for it. Frequently there is neither power
nor privilege for it; in that case it can be said that the act is
also void. But the situation may be such that an illegal act in-
volves legal consequences and new legal relations; in such cases
there is a power to do the act, but not the privilege. All crimes
and torts would certainly fall within this grouping, and there
are occasionally instances in contracts where the law imposes a
penalty and yet gives legal consequences to the act." It remains
to be seen whether or not the federal cases consistently maintain
the position that ultra vires contracts are illegal and void.
As we have seen, the view is generally accepted that a corpora-
tion does not have the privilege of entering into ultra vires acts.
It is when we come to the matter of powers that we find con-
a' Possibly the want of a privilege to do the act could be found in the
fac that the opposite party can bring an action to have the void act set
aside. This, however, would seem merely to settle the point of the want
of power to do the act, unless we found the lack of a privilege (duty not
to do) in the fact that a court will assess costs. Possibly in this we could
find a sufficient penalty to reason that there was no privilege to do a
legally void act.
3S ee 3 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 1630; Anson, Contract (Cor-
bin's ed. 1919) 304-307.
"Let us now concede that the unauthorized contracts of a corporation
are illegal in the sense contended for. It by no means follows that they
are never to be enforced. An agreement declared by statute to be void
cannot be enforced because such is the legislative will. But when, with-
out any such declaration, it is simply illegal, it is capable of enforcement
where justice plainly requires it." Mr. Justice Comstock, in Bissell v.
Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Cos., supra note 13,
at 273.
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fusion. If also the power does not exist, it then follows that such
conduct is devoid of legal consequences, i. e., it is void. In the
Pullvn case,35 MBr. Justice Gray was quoted to the effect that
ultra vires contracts of corporations were void and unlawful.
We appeal to him once more. In. the case of St. Louis Railroad
Go. v. Terre Haute Railroad Co.,CT a suit was brought by the
lessor company to set aside an ultra vires lease. The Supreme
Court refused this relief. The following is a quotation from the
opinion of Mvr. Justice Gray:
"When the parties are iz. parl delicto, and the contract has
been fully executed on the part of the plaintiff, by the convey-
ance of property, or by the payment of money, and has not been
repudiated by the defendant, it is now equally well settled that
neither a court of law nor a court of equity will assist the plain-
tiff to recover back the property conveyed or money paid under
the contract." -
Surely, this leaves Mr. Justice Gray in a dilemma. If this
decision was correct, the contract was not void and the language
in the Pu.llma case was inaccurate. If the language in the Pull-
.?an case was accurate, the Terre Haute decision was wrong. It
is plausible but not convincing to say that in the latter case the
parties were in pari delicto and that in such cases the courts will
refuse their aid. If the contract was actually void, i. e., that
there was no power to make it, then no property could have
passed under it, and the court ought to have set it aside. Pos-
sibly the contract was illegal (but not void) in the sense of there
being no privilege to make it, but since the Supreme Court
would not set it aside, there must have been the power to make
it. This reasoning would explain the Terre Haute case, but in
the Pullman case the language was that ultra vires contracts
were both unlawful and void. This could mean only that there
was neither privilege nor power to make them.
To reconcile these two cases and others yet to be noted we
must take the position that the language in the Pullman case
was too broad. The privilege does not exist to enter into ultra
vires contracts, and in that sense these transactions may be con-
sidered illegal,30 but they are not void. To sustain the Terre
3 Supra note 33.
37 (1891) 145 U. S. 393, 12 Sup. Ct. 953.
S Ibid. at 407, 12 Sup. Ct. at 956.
so Much objection has been emphasized to the use and the term illcgal
in connection with ultra vires acts of corporations, based principally on
the theory that such acts are not immoral or against public policy. The
writer has sympathy with this view, but believes it lacls discrimination.
An ultra vires act is illegal, not because it is immoral, but because there
is no privilege for it. As said by Pepper, op. cit. smpra note 29, at 25G:
"Now the invalidity of an unauthorized corporate contract arises, not from
the subject matter, but from the incapacity of one of the contracting
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Haute case, we must assume that the legal power existed to enter
into the contract, but since under the holding of the Pullman case
(and other federal cases) this contract could be defeated before
being fully executed, we must find another power in the opposite
party to defeat the contract up to the time it has become fully
executed. Once, though, the contract is fully executed that power
ceases to exist, and the contract stands indefeasible.
In certain federal cases the reasoning approaches that of the
English courts in the royal charter cases; at least it submits to
the same analysis. We find particularly that no collateral attack
is permitted, because of the ultra vires nature of the transaction,
where the passing of title to property is involved. 40 In National
Bank v. Matthew841 the court said:
"Where a corporation is incompetent by its charter to take A
title to real estate, a conveyance to it is not void, but only void
able, and the sovereign alone can object. It is valid until as-
sailed in a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose. * *
The impending danger of a judgment of ouster and dissolution
was, we think, the check and none other contemplated by Cor-
gress. That has been always the punishment prescribed for a
wanton violation of a charter, and it may be made to follow
wherever the proper public authority shall see fit to invoke its
application. A private person cannot, directly or indirecty,
usurp this function of the government."
Since the state may interfere, the situation here is that the
corporation has not the privilege to engage in these ultra vires
transactions, but, since legal consequence will be given them,
there is a legal power for them.
parties. It is said to be illegal, but it is illegal, not because this agree-
ment is itself immoral, but because the law denies the corporation power
[privilege] to enter into the agreement".
40 National Bank v. Matthews (1878) 98 U. S. 621; Jones v. Guaranty
and Indemnity Co. (1879) 101 U. S. 622; Jones v. Habersham (1882) 107
U. S. 174, 2 Sup. Ct. 336; Reynolds 'v. Crawfordsville Bank (1884) 112
U. S. 405, 5 Sup. Ct. 213; Fritts v. Palmer (1889) 132 U. S. 282, 10 Sup.
Ct. 93; Schuyler National Bank v. Gadsden (1903) 191 U. S. 451, 24 Sup,
Ct. 129; Kerfoot v. Farmers' Bank (1910) 218 U. S. 281, 31 Sup. Ct. 14;
Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co. (1913, S. D. Iowa) 202 Fed. 776;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens (1915) 214 N. Y. 488, 108 N. E. 856;
Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. Fisher (1909) 52 Wash. 246, 100 Pac. 724.
Cf. California Bank v. Kennedy (1897) 167 U. S. 362, 17 Sup. Ct. 831;
Watkins v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. (1904) 123 Iowa 390, 98 N. W. 910.
In Kerfoot v. Farmers' Bank the court, in holding that a conveyance
of land is voidable only at the instance of the state, said, "This rule, while
recognizing the authority of the Government to which the corporation is
amenable, has the salutary effect of assuring the security of titles and of
avoiding the injurious consequences which would otherwise result." Op.
cit. supra note 40, at 287, 31 Sup. Ct. at 15.
41 Op. cit. supra note 40, at 628, 629. Quoted by Warren, op. cit. supra.
note 15, at 499.
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The view has been adhered to in the federal courts, where one
-party to an ultra vires contract has received the benefit of a
performance by the other, that the latter has no remedy on the
contract although the former has not performed at allA2 Relief,
however, is frequently given to the party who has parted with
consideration on the principles of quasi-contract3 While it is
commonly said of these cases that the contract is void, we prefer
to think, as has been pointed out, that it is not void, but that
there exists up to a point a power to defeat it. Assuming then
that there is a power in the defendant to defeat the contract, and
so to prevent a recovery on that basis, it does not follow that the
plaintiff is remediless. Aside from the defeasible power to enter
into the contract, there was a distinct power for a quasi-contrac-
tual relation, and, in a proper case, recovery can be had through
this channel.
While recovery is denied in the federal courts and some of the
state courts on partially executed ultra vires contracts, many o
the state courts permit an action in such cases on the contract
itself.44 The view of these courts is, that while the contract is
wholly executory, it may be defeated, but when one party has
performed and the other has not, the latter, in the interests of
public policy, is not allowed to set up the defense of ultra vires.
The situation here is that while there is a power to make the
contract, so long as it remains wholly executory there is in the
opposite party a power to defeat it, but on the performance of
one party this power to defeat is extinguished in the other. The
point where the contract is indefeasible is merely reached sooner
in these cases than in the federal ones.
"Again, it is now settled, both at law and in equity, that a
contract of a corporation, apparently within the scope of its
powers, though actually beyond them, is binding on it. * * *
But if a corporation has only such powers as are expressly con-
ferred on it by its charter, and is 'non-existent' for all other
purposes, it can not increase them by seeming to have greater.
Using the same kind of logic that underlies the theory itself, it
might even be said that a corporation cannot seem to have
greater powers than it actually possesses, since the power of so
seeming is not expressly conferred upon it. The only instance
in our law, outside of corporations, where we find a physical
capacity, combined with an absolute legal incapacity, to contract,
is in the case of a married woman; and it is undeniably the law
that the contract of a woman actually covert is absolutely void
and not binding on her, though she be apparently sole, and even
though she assert herself to be a feme sole, and the contract is
42 2 Machen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 838-840.
4uIb&d at 840-841; 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 35, sec. 371.
4-12 Blachen, op. cit. at 851-855.
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made on the faith of that statement and her apparent dis-
coverture." 15
Such ultra vires contracts of corporations are binding even
while purely executory; they furnish another instance where the
state recognizes the power to enter into legal relations even
though no privilege to do so has been conferred.
In conclusion, while this study was not undertaken in a re-
formatory spirit, certain general observations may be helpful.
It is believed that much of the confusion in the cases examined
has been due, first, to the notion of the special creation-the
special capacity theory of corporations; and, secondly, to the
effort in the interests of sound policy, to get away from the evil
results of that theory. The thought is ventured that if the courts
had emphasized the corporate entity and the special creation
theory less, and had viewed the corporation more as a group of
individuals which had certain privileges, and then had made dis-
,tinction between privileges and powers, less difficulty would have
Ifresulted. The writer, while not free from doubt, believes that
Ipublic policy would be promoted if the view were taken in all
cases that, though a corporation may not have the privilege for
ultra vires conduct, it yet should have the power for it. For this
there is much precedent-more than the courts ordinarily recog-
nize. As we have seen, precedent is to be found in certain ultra
vires acts which are covered by the cloak of apparently being
within the privileges and powers of the organization, in cases
where partially executed contracts are enforced, in the fields
where the transfer of title is involved, in cases of executed con-
tracts, in the royal charter cases and lastly in the closely related
field of de facto corporations. This doctrine has not worked a
hardship in its application to de facto corporations; in fact it
there seems generally to be commended. It is believed that the
better view is that the allowance of a collateral attack on the
corporate powers and privileges is objectionable and that it
would be beneficial if the position were to be taken that such
questions should be determined solely in a direct proceeding by
the sovereign.
45 G. H. W., op. cit. supra note 4, at 5. This comment was written
before the wave of married woman's acts was well under way.
